43 Days in Orbit, and Lessons for Modern Reactor Developers
Executive Summary
The SNAP 10A reactor, launched April 3, 1965, remains the only American fission reactor operated in space, and a failed voltage regulator ended its mission after 43 days.
Atomics International built the reactor, about 30 kilowatts thermal, for the Atomic Energy Commission SNAP program, and the U.S. Air Force flew it. Controllers started it by remote command in a polar orbit near 1,300 kilometers, and it exceeded its 500 watt electrical goal. On May 16, 1965, a fault in the Agena spacecraft triggered an automatic reactor shutdown that could not be reversed. The reactor remains in that orbit, and since November 1979 it has shed more than 100 pieces of debris.
Developers of lunar surface and orbital reactors face the same design decisions SNAP 10A faced. A reactor must start safely, it must survive faults in equipment outside the core, and it needs a defined end of life. SNAP 10A started only in orbit, which left no fission products in the core during launch, and its shutdown ejected the reflector, which closed any path to a restart. The orbit it left behind has an estimated lifetime near 1,000 years.
The legal consequences sit in Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Liability Convention of 1972, National Security Presidential Memorandum 20 of August 20, 2019, and Space Policy Directive 6 of December 16, 2020. Together they place responsibility, absolute liability for damage on Earth, and disposal expectations on the launching party.
Detailed Findings
What Is the SNAP 10A Reactor and How Did It Work?
SNAP 10A is a liquid metal cooled, thermoelectric space reactor of about 30 kilowatts thermal that Atomics International designed to deliver at least 500 watts of electricity for one year. The core held 37 fuel rods of uranium zirconium hydride, a fuel that also moderates neutrons, and it sat inside beryllium reflectors with control drums that adjusted reactivity. A liquid metal conduction pump with no moving parts circulated a eutectic sodium potassium alloy, known as NaK, from the core to the converters. There, doped silicon germanium thermoelectric junctions turned the temperature difference between the hot coolant and a radiator into direct current electricity.
The reactor vessel measured about 40 centimeters long and 23 centimeters across. In the 1962 test configuration the complete power system ran about 10.8 feet long and weighed about 875 pounds.
An Atlas Agena D rocket lifted the system from Vandenberg Air Force Base on April 3, 1965, into a near circular polar orbit with a perigee of 1,268 kilometers, an apogee of 1,317 kilometers, and an inclination of 90.2 degrees. Controllers started the reactor by remote command only after it reached orbit, so the core held no fission products during launch. Reported electrical output after startup exceeded the 500 watt goal, with published maxima from 590 watts to more than 600 watts.
Why Did SNAP 10A Shut Down After 43 Days?
SNAP 10A shut down on May 16, 1965, after an electrical failure on the Agena spacecraft triggered the reactor’s automatic shutdown. Accounts of the failure describe a high voltage fault, a failed voltage regulator, or erroneous commands. Every account places the cause in equipment outside the reactor.
The shutdown sequence ejected the reflector, which ended the chain reaction and made a restart impossible. Ground controllers lost contact that day, 43 days after startup. All flight test objectives were met except the planned duration of one year.
How Was a Launched Reactor Made Safe Before Flight?
Atomics International, the Air Force, and Sandia National Laboratories made SNAP 10A safe to launch through destructive testing and an orbit only startup. In 1962 the Air Force ran 14 tests at Holloman Air Force Base that exposed reactor hardware to liquid oxygen spray, fire at 4,500 degrees Fahrenheit, a calculated explosive overpressure of about 890 pounds per square inch, concrete drops at about 80 feet per second, and water impacts at 570 to 596 feet per second.
A concrete impact at 560 feet per second disintegrated the reactor assembly completely, and the test report could not determine whether a nuclear excursion occurred. In the water impacts at 570 and 596 feet per second the core vessel stayed intact, although the radiator end tore off in the faster test and some fuel rods were thrown clear. The report records that missing instrumentation limited what the tests could prove, and it recommended control drum position sensors and break wires on the reflector band. Sandia ran further safety tests, including the SNAPTRAN 3 destructive excursion test in Idaho on April 1, 1964.
Where Is the SNAP 10A Reactor Now and What Has It Shed?
The SNAP 10A reactor remains in a polar orbit near 1,300 kilometers altitude, and estimates of its orbital lifetime run to about 1,000 years. Since November 1979 the satellite has shed debris. The U.S. Space Surveillance Network tracks 51 objects from it, and radar measurements published in 2006 identified at least 60 more fragments, all but two smaller than 10 centimeters. The cause of the shedding is unknown, and a collision is one candidate. At 90 degrees inclination the orbit plane shows essentially no precession, so the fragments stay in nearly the same plane.
The mission was short, and the fission product inventory is correspondingly small. Thirty kilowatts thermal for 43 days is about 1.1 times 10 to the 11th joules. At roughly 200 million electron volts per fission, that implies no more than about 1.4 grams of uranium 235 fissioned, assuming full power for every day. A commercial reactor of 3,000 megawatts thermal fissions that quantity in about 40 seconds at full power.
How Does SNAP 10A Compare With Later Space Reactors?
The Soviet radar ocean reconnaissance satellites, which flew fission reactors in low orbits, produced the reentry that tested the liability rules. Cosmos 954 reentered over northern Canada on January 24, 1978. Canada presented a claim under the Liability Convention, and the two governments settled it by protocol in 1981. After the 1978 reentry, later Soviet satellites ejected their reactor cores to higher orbits at end of mission, and the liquid NaK coolant vented as droplets that formed a debris population NASA has since modeled.
What Did SNAP 10A Teach Modern Reactor Developers?
SNAP 10A teaches that a space reactor is judged as an integrated system, and that its recovery path from a nonnuclear fault has to be designed before launch. In my years as a nuclear trained submarine officer, a plant trip from a nonnuclear cause such as a power supply fault came with a recovery procedure written long before the trip occurred. SNAP 10A carried the opposite design. The reflector ejection that stopped the reactor removed any path back to power.
A liquid metal coolant allowed higher core temperatures at lower system pressure, which supported the thermoelectric conversion and a safer operating envelope. Starting the reactor only in orbit removed the launch accident case in which a damaged operating core scatters fission products. Both choices remain in the design vocabulary of current small reactors.
The development program centered on the core, and the mission ended because of a part the core did not contain. A modern lunar or orbital reactor will be evaluated from the launch vehicle’s electrical bus through the converter and radiator, with the core as one element of that chain. In August 2025 NASA leadership moved to speed a lunar surface fission reactor toward a launch ready date of 2030, which places that integrated evaluation on a near term calendar.
Legal and Regulatory Implications
What Do the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention Require?
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 makes the United States internationally responsible for national activities in outer space, including those of nongovernmental entities, and the Liability Convention of 1972 makes a launching state subject to absolute liability for damage caused on the surface of the Earth. Article VI of the treaty requires authorization and continuing supervision of private activity by the appropriate state. Article VII makes the launching state internationally liable for damage to another state or its persons caused by a space object. Article II of the Liability Convention applies the absolute standard to damage on the surface and to aircraft in flight, and the Cosmos 954 claim of 1978 to 1981 is the working example of that standard applied to a nuclear powered satellite.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/68 of December 14, 1992, sets Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space. Its Principle 3 limits reactor operation to interplanetary missions and sufficiently high orbits, with low orbit operation tied to storage in a sufficiently high orbit afterward. SNAP 10A, which orbits near 1,300 kilometers and was never moved, predates that resolution by 27 years.
What Do NSPM 20 and Space Policy Directive 6 Require?
National Security Presidential Memorandum 20 of August 20, 2019, established safety guidelines and safety analysis and review processes for launches of spacecraft with space nuclear systems. Space Policy Directive 6 of December 16, 2020, published in the Federal Register on December 21, 2020, sets the national strategy. It permits fission reactors on interplanetary missions, in sufficiently high orbits, or in low Earth orbit if they are moved to a sufficiently high orbit after the operational phase. It defines a sufficiently high orbit as one whose lifetime lets fission products decay to radioactivity comparable to uranium 235 before reentry, with risks to existing and future missions and of collision minimized. A reactor operated in low Earth orbit must include a highly reliable system for controlled disposition.
Which U.S. Agencies Authorize a Space Reactor Launch?
For a federal mission the sponsoring agency holds primary safety responsibility, and for a commercial launch the Secretary of Transportation licenses the launch or reentry. Space Policy Directive 6 states that a payload review may be part of a license application review or may be requested separately under 51 U.S.C. § 50904. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing pathways for terrestrial reactors under 10 C.F.R. Part 50 and Part 52 address facilities on the ground, and the directive routes space reactors through the sponsoring agency and the Department of Transportation.
Section 170d of the Atomic Energy Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d), authorizes the Department of Energy to indemnify its contractors for nuclear incidents arising from activities under their contracts. Whether a commercial operator of a lunar reactor holds comparable protection depends on the contract structure.
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Open Questions
Which orbit satisfies the definition of sufficiently high for a reactor that operates in low Earth orbit? Space Policy Directive 6 ties the answer to fission product decay and collision risk. A 1,300 kilometer orbit with an estimated lifetime near 1,000 years gives the size of the numbers, and this research located no published altitude that converts the directive’s test for a larger reactor.
What caused the debris shedding that began in November 1979, and does any of it contain NaK? Radar can size fragments of 10 centimeters and larger. It cannot identify composition, and coolant droplets behave differently from solid pieces in decay and in collision damage.
Can a modern reactor allow a restart after a nonnuclear fault without weakening the shutdown guarantee? Reflector ejection gave SNAP 10A a shutdown that needed no power. A restartable design has to hold that property and add a recovery path, which is an engineering trade that the sources reviewed for this report do not address.
What authorization sequence applies to a commercial lunar surface reactor with a 2030 target? The Department of Transportation payload review under 51 U.S.C. § 50904 and the sponsoring agency role both apply, and the sources reviewed give no order or duration for those reviews for a first commercial reactor.
Who carries liability for a commercial reactor under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)? The treaty places liability on the launching state, and the statute indemnifies Department of Energy contractors. A private operator on a lunar surface contract needs its own written allocation of that risk before launch.
Next in the Series: Plum Brook Reactor Facility
The next report covers the Plum Brook Reactor Facility in Ohio, where NASA operated a test reactor built to study materials for space programs and then closed it. That report will show what the decommissioning record says about who paid for a federal research reactor that outlived its mission, and how that cost history bears on lunar reactor contracts.
Source List
Primary nuclear sources, most authoritative first. U.S. Air Force Special Weapons Center, SNAP 10A Ground Test Program, Phase I, Technical Documentary Report AFSWC TDR 62 144, March 1963, by John D. Belson. This document records the 14 Holloman tests of 1962 and the instrumentation gaps that limited them.
U.S. Department of Energy, System for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) Overview, accessed October 9, 2026. The page states the launch date, the 500 watt design goal, the NaK coolant, the 43 day operating period, and the remote start in orbit.
Johnson, Morgan, and Rocklin of Atomics International, SNAP 10A, First Reactor in Space, SAE Technical Paper 650793, 1965. The authors describe the reactor and thermoelectric system, endurance testing on the ground test system, and flight results.
Stokely and Stansbery, Identification of a Debris Cloud from the Nuclear Powered SNAPSHOT Satellite with Haystack Radar Measurements, COSPAR Scientific Assembly, July 2006. The paper gives the 51 tracked objects and at least 60 additional fragments.
Xu and colleagues, Modeling of the Orbital Debris Population of RORSAT Sodium Potassium Droplets, COSPAR Scientific Assembly, July 2010. The paper describes core ejection and NaK venting on later Soviet reactors.
Primary legal sources. Space Policy Directive 6, National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion, December 16, 2020, Federal Register, Volume 85, Number 245, December 21, 2020. It states the orbit and disposal criteria and the agency roles. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Liability Convention of 1972, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/68 of 1992, 51 U.S.C. § 50904, and 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) supply the liability and authorization rules.
Secondary nuclear sources. Hampshire, Nuclear Applications for Space, Nuclear News, April 2023, which describes the reflector ejection shutdown and the liquid metal coolant rationale. The American Nuclear Society Nuclear Newswire article of September 2, 2025, which reports the 2030 lunar reactor target. Chang, Nuclear Technology, volume 207, 2021, which reviews implementation of the 2019 launch safety guidelines.
Secondary legal and general sources. The Canada and Soviet Union protocol of April 2, 1981, on the Cosmos 954 claim, and the Wikipedia article on SNAP 10A, used for orbital elements, the 37 fuel rods, and the 1979 debris onset.
Bibliography
Belson, John D. SNAP 10A Ground Test Program, Phase I. Technical Documentary Report AFSWC TDR 62 144. Kirtland Air Force Base, NM: Air Force Special Weapons Center, March 1963. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD0406123.pdf.
Chang, Yale. Considerations for Implementing Presidential Memorandum 20 Guidelines for Nuclear Safety Launch Authorization for Future Civil Space Missions. Nuclear Technology 207, no. 6 (June 2021): 844 to 850.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
Hampshire, Jeremy. Nuclear Applications for Space. Nuclear News, American Nuclear Society, April 2023. https://wx1.ans.org/pubs/magazines/download/a_1328.
Johnson, Richard A., William T. Morgan, and Sol R. Rocklin. SNAP 10A, First Reactor in Space. SAE Technical Paper 650793. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, 1965.
Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G.A. Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by Cosmos 954, Can. and U.S.S.R., April 2, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 689 (1981).
Space Policy Directive 6, National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion, December 16, 2020, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 245 (December 21, 2020).
Stokely, C., and E. Stansbery. Identification of a Debris Cloud from the Nuclear Powered SNAPSHOT Satellite with Haystack Radar Measurements. Paper presented at the 36th COSPAR Scientific Assembly, Beijing, July 2006. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20060028182.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
U.S. Department of Energy. System for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) Overview. Accessed October 9, 2026. https://www.energy.gov/node/4834192.
Wikipedia. SNAP 10A. Accessed October 9, 2026.
Xu, Y. L., P. H. Krisko, M. Matney, and E. G. Stansbery. Modeling of the Orbital Debris Population of RORSAT Sodium Potassium Droplets. Paper presented at the 38th COSPAR Scientific Assembly, Bremen, July 2010. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20100006950/downloads/20100006950.pdf.
American Nuclear Society. Nuclear Power on the Moon: What We Are Watching. Nuclear Newswire, September 2, 2025.
51 U.S.C. § 50904. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d). 10 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 52.
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