Secondary Stock Sales: Legal Analysis

Executive Summary

The secondary market for private company stock and venture capital fund interests has grown into a major institutional asset class. Global secondary transaction volume reached approximately $240 billion in 2025, a 48 percent year-over-year increase and the largest annual total on record. That growth reflects mounting liquidity pressure among early employees, angel investors, and institutional limited partners (the passive investors in a venture fund who contribute capital but bear no management responsibility for fund operations or investment decisions) who have watched the IPO window remain largely closed while holding illiquid positions in companies worth hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

This report analyzes the legal and regulatory framework governing two distinct but related categories of secondary transactions: first, direct secondary sales of private company stock by stockholders such as founders, employees, and early investors; and second, secondary sales of interests held by venture capital funds, including limited partner interest transfers and adviser-led secondary transactions in which a VC fund general partner (the managing partner who controls the fund, makes investment decisions, and owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners) rolls portfolio assets into a continuation vehicle. These transactions sit at the intersection of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and a dense web of contractual restrictions embedded in shareholder agreements, limited partnership agreements, and company governing documents.

The central legal challenge in any secondary transaction is ensuring that the resale of unregistered, restricted securities is exempt from the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. Restricted securities are shares originally acquired in a private, unregistered offering: they are not freely tradeable and cannot be resold without the seller independently qualifying for a federal exemption from registration. The principal exemptions available are Rule 144 under the Securities Act, Section 4(a)(1), the judicially developed Section 4(a)(1 and one half) doctrine, Section 4(a)(7) as codified by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015, and Rule 144A for institutional resales.
On the fund side, the SEC’s August 2023 private fund adviser rules, which would have required fairness opinions for adviser-led secondary transactions, were vacated in their entirety by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in June 2024. Despite the vacatur, the SEC’s Division of Examinations has continued to flag adviser-led secondaries as a source of undisclosed conflicts of interest, and enforcement risk under existing anti-fraud authority remains real
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Detailed Findings

I. The Securities Law Framework for Secondary Sales

Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. Section 77e) prohibits any person from offering or selling a security through interstate commerce unless a registration statement is in effect for that security or a valid exemption from registration applies. This prohibition extends to any seller, not merely to the issuer: the company that originally created and distributed the security in a primary offering. The distinction matters because investors who later attempt to resell those shares are not the issuer, yet they are still fully bound by Section 5 and must satisfy their own exemption from registration before completing any resale.

Private company shares sold in venture financing rounds are issued pursuant to an exemption from registration, typically Regulation D, and are therefore classified as restricted securities under Rule 144(a)(3). Restricted securities are shares acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer, or from a person who controls the issuer, in a transaction that was never registered with the SEC. Because they were never publicly offered, they bear transfer restriction legends on share certificates or in transfer agent records, and they cannot be sold again without the seller locating and satisfying an independent registration exemption. The restriction runs with the shares: receiving them in a secondary purchase does not make them freely tradeable.

The key threshold question in every secondary transaction is therefore not whether the seller is subject to securities law, but which exemption applies, and whether its conditions can be satisfied given the specific facts: who the seller is, who the buyer is, how long the seller has held the shares, how many shares are being sold, and how the transaction is solicited and structured.

II. Rule 144: The Primary Safe Harbor for Resales

Rule 144 (17 CFR Section 230.144) provides the most commonly used safe harbor for the resale of restricted and control securities. Rule 144 establishes conditions under which a seller is deemed not to be an underwriter for purposes of Section 4(a)(1). An underwriter, as defined in Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act, is any person who purchases securities from the issuer with a view to distributing them broadly to the public, rather than holding them as a genuine investment. The legal significance of the underwriter label is decisive: if a secondary seller qualifies as an underwriter, the Section 4(a)(1) exemption, which is available to ordinary investors conducting routine resales, is entirely unavailable, and the seller faces full Section 5 registration liability. Rule 144, by satisfying its conditions, provides the safe harbor that prevents this classification.

Rule 144 draws a fundamental distinction between two categories of sellers based on their relationship to the issuing company. An affiliate is any person who directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the issuer. In practice, affiliates are founders, officers, directors, and any person owning 10 percent or more of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities, as well as entities those persons control. An affiliate holds practical power over the company’s business and decisions, which is why the law treats their stock sales with heightened scrutiny. A non-affiliate is anyone who lacks that control relationship: a rank-and-file employee who holds options, an early angel investor with a small position, or a seed-stage institutional investor that has no board seat and no controlling stake.

For non-affiliates of the issuer, Rule 144 requires that the seller have held the restricted securities for a minimum of six months if the issuer is a reporting company, meaning a company that has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or that is required to file periodic reports with the SEC under Section 15(d), including the annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form 10-Q, and current Form 8-K. Most publicly traded companies are reporting companies. Virtually every private venture-backed startup, however, is a non-reporting company: a company with no class of securities registered under the Exchange Act and no periodic SEC filing obligation. For non-reporting companies, Rule 144 requires a minimum one-year holding period before any resale by a non-affiliate.

After satisfying the applicable holding period, a non-affiliate of a non-reporting company may resell without limitation as to volume or manner of sale, but only provided that adequate current public information about the issuer is available. This condition is not satisfied simply because the company is well known or widely covered in the press. For a non-reporting company, adequate current public information under Rule 144(c)(2) means that the company has made specific categories of information publicly available: a description of its business and the products or services it offers; the names of the company’s officers and directors; the names of any persons known to own more than 10 percent of the outstanding shares; and audited financial statements including a balance sheet and profit and loss statement for the two most recently completed fiscal years. Because most private startups do not publish this information for competitive and confidentiality reasons, the adequate current public information condition is routinely unsatisfied for non-reporting company secondary sales, even after the one-year holding period expires.

For affiliates of the issuer, volume limitations apply regardless of the holding period: an affiliate may not sell, during any three-month period, more than one percent of the outstanding shares of the class being sold. Because private company shares are not traded on a national securities exchange, the alternative volume ceiling tied to average reported weekly trading volume is unavailable, and the one percent limit is the only operative cap. Affiliates must also satisfy specific manner-of-sale requirements and file a Form 144 with the SEC if the contemplated sale exceeds 5,000 shares or $50,000 in any three-month period.
Rule 144 is expressly unavailable for securities of shell companies: issuers that have no or nominal operations and no or nominal assets other than cash. This restriction applies in special purpose acquisition company transactions and reverse merger scenarios unless at least twelve months have elapsed since the company ceased to be a shell and filed current Exchange Act reporting.

III. Section 4(a)(1) and the Section 4(a)(1 and one half) Doctrine

Section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. Section 77d(a)(1)) exempts from registration transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. A dealer, as defined in Section 2(a)(12) of the Securities Act, is any person who engages, for all or part of their time, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person, whether as agent, broker, or principal. A person who makes a single, isolated secondary sale of their own restricted securities is generally not a dealer. A platform or intermediary that regularly matches buyers and sellers for compensation is a dealer that must register as a broker-dealer under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.

The central risk in Section 4(a)(1) resales, as discussed in Section II above, is the underwriter classification. A seller who purchased shares directly from the company and then immediately seeks to resell them broadly may be found to have purchased with a view to distribution, thereby qualifying as a statutory underwriter. Courts and practitioners developed the Section 4(a)(1 and one half) doctrine to fill the gap between Section 4(a)(1) and Section 4(a)(2) (which exempts the original issuer’s transactions not involving a public offering). The doctrine, recognized in Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989), permits resales to sophisticated purchasers who have access to information equivalent to what a full SEC registration statement would provide, and who are independently capable of evaluating the investment’s merits and risks. The doctrine is entirely judicially created: it has no statutory text, no regulatory safe harbor, and no preemptive effect on state securities laws. Sellers who rely on it carry the full risk that a court may disagree with their analysis.

IV. Section 4(a)(7): The Statutory Safe Harbor for Secondary Sales

Section 4(a)(7) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. Section 77d(a)(7)), added by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act in December 2015, provides a statutory safe harbor for resales of restricted securities to accredited investors: persons who satisfy at least one of the financial thresholds set in Regulation D Rule 501(a), including a net worth exceeding $1 million (excluding the value of the primary residence), annual income exceeding $200,000 individually or $300,000 with a spouse in each of the two most recent years, or institutional status as a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, or similar entity. The accredited investor concept reflects a congressional judgment that persons with sufficient wealth or institutional sophistication can protect themselves in private transactions without the disclosure protections that full SEC registration provides.
Section 4(a)(7) requires that the transaction not involve any general solicitation: that is, the shares may not be advertised to the general public through newspapers, magazines, television, radio, mass email campaigns, or unrestricted public posts on social media platforms. General solicitation destroys the private character of the transaction and the exemption along with it. A secondary seller cannot post on a public platform offering shares for sale and then invoke Section 4(a)(7).

A critical advantage of Section 4(a)(7) is that it qualifies as a covered security under Section 18(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Act. This designation means that state blue sky laws, the securities registration and merit-review statutes that each of the fifty states enacted independently during the early twentieth century, are federally preempted for transactions satisfying Section 4(a)(7)’s conditions. Without this preemption, a secondary seller would need to independently qualify for an exemption under the securities law of every state in which a buyer is located, a compliance burden that can easily become prohibitive in a transaction with geographically dispersed buyers.

The statute also imposes a disclosure requirement that creates a structural dependency on the issuer. The seller must deliver to each buyer a current balance sheet and profit and loss statement (dated within sixteen months of the sale), a brief description of the issuer’s business and services, and the names of its officers, directors, and principal stockholders owning more than 10 percent. These materials must come from the issuer. If the company refuses to provide them, the Section 4(a)(7) exemption is unavailable and the seller cannot complete the transaction under this safe harbor. Securities sold under Section 4(a)(7) remain restricted securities in the buyer’s hands and cannot be freely resold without the buyer independently qualifying for its own exemption.

V. Rule 144A: Institutional Secondary Sales

Rule 144A (17 CFR Section 230.144A) provides a separate safe harbor for resales of restricted securities to qualified institutional buyers, or QIBs: institutions that in the aggregate own and invest on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers with which they have no affiliation. The $100 million threshold reflects the premise that institutions managing capital at that scale have the analytical resources and market experience to participate in unregistered transactions without the protections that SEC registration provides to retail investors. For registered broker-dealers, the threshold is reduced to $10 million. Eligible QIBs include mutual funds, pension plans, insurance companies, and registered investment companies. High-net-worth individual investors, even those who qualify as accredited investors, do not qualify as QIBs and cannot participate in Rule 144A transactions.

Unlike Rule 144, Rule 144A imposes no holding period requirement: a seller can transfer restricted securities to a QIB the day after acquiring them, without waiting one year. Rule 144A also qualifies as a covered security, preempting state blue sky laws for QIB transactions. The seller must take reasonable steps to ensure the buyer knows the seller is relying on Rule 144A, and the securities being resold must not be of the same class as securities listed on a national securities exchange. Rule 144A is the dominant framework for large institutional secondary transactions involving private company preferred stock and convertible instruments.

VI. Contractual Restrictions: ROFR, Co-Sale Rights, and Lock-Up Agreements

Satisfying a federal securities law exemption is necessary but not sufficient for a valid secondary sale. The seller must also comply with any contractual restrictions on transfer embedded in the company’s charter documents, bylaws, and stockholder agreements. The most common contractual restriction is the right of first refusal, commonly abbreviated as ROFR: a contractual mechanism that gives specified parties the right to purchase the shares being sold on the same terms offered to any outside buyer, before the seller can close with that outside buyer. The ROFR functions as a gatekeeper that lets existing stakeholders intercept a secondary sale rather than allowing an unknown third party to become a stockholder.
Under the standard NVCA model right of first refusal and co-sale agreement, the company holds a primary ROFR over any proposed transfer by a key holder (a founder or early employee specified in the agreement). If the company declines, the participating preferred stockholders (the VC investors) hold a secondary ROFR over whatever the company declined to purchase. If both decline, the seller may proceed with the outside sale, but only on terms no more favorable than those presented during the ROFR process, and within the specified window of time. A transfer completed in violation of the ROFR process, for example by closing with the outside buyer before the notice period expires or at a lower price than was disclosed, is typically void under the terms of the agreement, meaning the transfer is legally invalid from the outset and the company can refuse to recognize the purported new stockholder.

The co-sale right, also called the tag-along right, entitles participating investors to sell a proportionate share of their own holdings alongside the selling key holder to the same outside buyer on identical terms. Lock-up agreements separately prohibit any transfer during specified periods, most commonly 180 days following a company’s IPO, and sometimes during pre-IPO periods tied to specific financing rounds. Board approval requirements in the company’s charter may also give the company practical veto power over secondary transfers regardless of whether a ROFR applies.

VII. Section 12(g) and the Risk of Inadvertent Registration

Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78l(g)) requires a company to register a class of equity securities with the SEC if the company has total assets exceeding $10 million and the class is held of record by 2,000 or more persons, or by 500 or more persons who are not accredited investors. A holder of record is the person in whose name a security is registered in the company’s own stockholder records on the date of measurement. This is distinct from a beneficial owner, who is the person who actually owns the economic interest and bears the investment risk, even if the shares are registered in the name of a broker or nominee. Because secondary market platforms often hold shares in a single nominee name on behalf of many underlying purchasers, the holder-of-record count for Section 12(g) purposes may be considerably lower than the number of actual economic participants.

An active secondary market in a company’s shares creates material risk of inadvertently crossing the Section 12(g) threshold. As shares change hands through platforms such as Forge Global, EquityZen, and Hiive, the number of record holders can increase faster than management tracks. The JOBS Act of 2012 raised the threshold from 500 to 2,000 holders of record for most private companies, and added the 500-non-accredited-investor subcategory. Once the threshold is crossed, the company has 120 days from the end of its fiscal year to either file a registration statement or reduce its holder count below the limit. Exchange Act registration triggers ongoing periodic reporting obligations (Form 10-K annually, Form 10-Q quarterly, and Form 8-K for current events), proxy statement requirements, and Section 16 insider trading reporting obligations.

Shares held by persons who received them pursuant to an employee compensation plan in a transaction exempt from Section 5 registration are excluded from the Section 12(g) holder count under the JOBS Act. However, shares subsequently transferred in secondary transactions lose that exclusion and reenter the count.

VIII. Tender Offer Rules Applicable to Private Company Secondary Transactions

When a secondary transaction is structured as a tender offer, meaning a publicly announced offer directed at existing stockholders to purchase their shares at a specified price within a defined period, the anti-fraud provisions of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and the procedural requirements of Regulation 14E apply even if the target company is private and its securities are not registered. The SEC has not adopted a bright-line definition of tender offer. Courts and the SEC apply a multi-factor test from Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), examining whether the offer is made to a broad class of holders, whether it is contingent on a minimum number of shares being tendered, whether it is open for only a limited period, and whether holders face pressure to sell.

Regulation 14E requires all tender offers to remain open for at least 20 business days and imposes anti-manipulation prohibitions. Rule 13e-4 imposes additional requirements on issuer self-tender offers (where the company itself is repurchasing its own shares), but only if the issuer already has a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. Most private companies do not meet that threshold, so Rule 13e-4 typically does not apply to private company tender offers, though Section 14(e) and Regulation 14E always do.

IX. VC Fund Secondary Sales: LP Interest Transfers and Adviser-Led Secondaries

Venture capital funds organized as limited partnerships regularly face secondary transaction questions from two directions. First, limited partners (LPs), the passive investors in the fund who contribute capital but have no role in investment decisions or fund operations, may seek to sell their LP interests to third parties to achieve liquidity before the fund terminates and distributes proceeds. Second, a general partner (GP), the managing entity that controls the fund, makes investment decisions, and owes fiduciary duties to the LPs, may organize an adviser-led secondary transaction, also called a GP-led secondary: a transaction in which the GP simultaneously acts as the manager of the existing fund selling its portfolio assets and as the sponsor and manager of a newly created continuation vehicle purchasing those same assets. This dual role places the GP on both sides of the transaction, creating an inherent structural conflict of interest because the GP effectively controls the price at which it sells assets to itself.

LP interest transfers are primarily governed by the fund’s limited partnership agreement, which almost universally requires GP consent to any transfer. GP consent requirements exist partly as a legal necessity: VC funds typically rely on an exemption from registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940, either Section 3(c)(1), which applies to funds with not more than 100 beneficial owners, or Section 3(c)(7), which applies to funds whose interests are held exclusively by qualified purchasers: persons or entities that meet a higher wealth threshold than accredited investors, specifically natural persons owning at least $5 million in investments, or institutions owning at least $25 million. Qualified purchasers are the legal designation for the most sophisticated category of private fund investors under the Investment Company Act, above and beyond the accredited investor standard. Any LP interest transfer that pushes a Section 3(c)(1) fund over 100 beneficial owners, or that results in a non-qualified purchaser holding interests in a Section 3(c)(7) fund, destroys the exemption and could compel the fund to register as an investment company with the SEC, triggering sweeping regulatory obligations that would fundamentally disrupt operations.

GP-led secondaries drew sustained regulatory attention from the SEC, which adopted the Private Fund Adviser Rules in August 2023 (Release IA-6383, 88 Fed. Reg. 63206). Those rules required registered investment advisers conducting a GP-led secondary to obtain an independent fairness opinion or valuation opinion: an assessment from a qualified professional with no material relationship to the adviser, evaluating whether the price and terms of the transaction are fair from the perspective of the existing LPs being asked to either sell or roll over. The disclosure of material business relationships between the adviser and the opinion provider was also required, to prevent advisers from obtaining opinions from affiliated or dependent service providers.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in National Association of Private Fund Managers v. SEC, No. 23-60471 (5th Cir. June 5, 2024), vacated the SEC’s private fund adviser rules in their entirety, holding that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 did not grant the agency the broad authority to regulate private fund governance that the 2023 rules exercised. The vacatur eliminated the mandatory fairness opinion requirement. The underlying Section 206 anti-fraud obligation, however, which has prohibited undisclosed material conflicts by investment advisers since 1940, was not vacated and remains fully operative. The SEC’s Division of Examinations identified conflicts of interest in adviser-led secondary transactions as an examination priority for fiscal year 2025, signaling that the agency intends to pursue existing enforcement authority against GPs who conduct these transactions without adequate conflict disclosure.

X. The Role of Secondary Market Platforms and Broker-Dealer Obligations

Secondary market platforms including Forge Global, EquityZen, Hiive, and AngelList serve as intermediaries matching sellers of restricted private company shares with accredited investor buyers. To operate as an intermediary receiving compensation for facilitating securities transactions, a platform must register as a broker-dealer under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act or qualify for an applicable exemption. All major secondary market platforms are registered broker-dealers subject to FINRA oversight, meaning they are members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the self-regulatory organization that oversees broker-dealer conduct and compliance. Transactions facilitated through these platforms most commonly rely on Section 4(a)(7) for retail accredited investor buyers or Rule 144A for institutional QIBs.

The FinCEN final rule issued August 28, 2024, extended anti-money laundering program requirements to SEC-registered investment advisers. Effective January 1, 2026, VC fund managers advising funds that participate in secondary transactions must maintain formal AML compliance programs, including customer identification procedures, suspicious activity reporting, and recordkeeping requirements consistent with the Bank Secrecy Act. This requirement brings VC fund managers into the same AML compliance framework that banks and broker-dealers have operated under for decades.

Open Questions

1. Will the SEC revisit secondary market regulation following the Fifth Circuit vacatur of the private fund adviser rules? The SEC under its current leadership has signaled a general preference for reducing regulatory burdens on private fund advisers, but the inherent conflicts of interest in GP-led secondaries may prompt targeted guidance or enforcement action rather than formal rulemaking.
2. How will the FinCEN AML rule effective January 1, 2026, affect VC funds that regularly participate in secondary transactions as buyers or sellers? The scope of customer identification requirements and the practicality of AML compliance for fund managers without large compliance staffs remain open questions.
3. Will the SEC revise the Section 12(g) holder-of-record counting methodology to account for the growing volume of secondary market activity through platforms such as Forge and EquityZen? The SEC opened a review of Section 12(g) counting methodology in 2022, but no final rule has been proposed or adopted as of April 2026.
4. What constitutes adequate conflict disclosure in a GP-led secondary transaction absent the mandatory fairness opinion requirement vacated by the Fifth Circuit? The Investment Advisers Act Section 206 duty of loyalty requires disclosure of material conflicts, but the SEC has not articulated in post-vacatur guidance exactly what disclosure suffices.
5. How do overlapping lock-up provisions, ROFR processes, and company transfer restriction bylaws interact when multiple parties compete for shares in high-demand secondary transactions? Courts have not uniformly resolved the question of which contractual restriction controls when multiple layers apply simultaneously.
6. Will Congress revisit accredited investor eligibility standards in a way that expands or narrows the pool of permissible buyers in Section 4(a)(7) secondary transactions? Several legislative proposals have suggested alternatives to the wealth-based accredited investor test, but none has been enacted as of April 2026.
7. As secondary transaction volume approaches and potentially exceeds $300 billion annually, will the SEC determine that secondary market platforms require a distinct regulatory framework beyond standard broker-dealer registration, particularly with respect to transaction reporting, price transparency, and market integrity?
Source List
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 77a et seq. Governing statute for registration and exemptions applicable to all secondary sales of private company securities.
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78a et seq. Governs tender offer rules under Section 14(e), registration thresholds under Section 12(g), and broker-dealer regulation under Section 15.
3. Rule 144, 17 CFR Section 230.144 (SEC, as amended 2008). Primary safe harbor for resale of restricted and control securities; conditions include holding period, volume limitations, adequate current public information, and manner of sale. Available at: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-II/part-230/section-230.144
4. Rule 144A, 17 CFR Section 230.144A. Safe harbor for institutional resales to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs owning at least $100 million in unaffiliated securities). No holding period required. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/230.144A
5. Section 4(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. Section 77d(a)(7), as added by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act), Pub. L. No. 114-94, Section 76001 (Dec. 4, 2015). Statutory safe harbor for resales to accredited investors; qualifies as a covered security preempting state blue sky laws.
6. National Association of Private Fund Managers v. SEC, No. 23-60471 (5th Cir. June 5, 2024). Fifth Circuit vacated SEC Private Fund Adviser Rules in their entirety, eliminating mandatory fairness opinion requirement for GP-led secondaries.
7. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. Section 80a-1 et seq. Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) provide exemptions from investment company registration relied upon by VC funds; LP interest transfers must not breach these exemption conditions.
8. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. Section 80b-1 et seq. Section 206 anti-fraud provisions apply to adviser-led secondary transactions regardless of the private fund rule vacatur.
9. SEC Release IA-6383, Private Fund Advisers; Documentation of Registered Investment Adviser Compliance Reviews (Aug. 23, 2023). Adopted rules for adviser-led secondaries (subsequently vacated). Available at: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-155
10. FinCEN Final Rule, AML Program Requirements for SEC-Registered Investment Advisers (Aug. 28, 2024). Extends AML obligations to VC fund managers effective January 1, 2026.
11. NVCA Model Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement (2019). Standard industry form governing ROFR and co-sale rights in VC-backed companies. Available at: https://nvca.org
12. Regulation 14E, 17 CFR Sections 240.14e-1 through 240.14e-8. Procedural requirements for all tender offers, including private company tender offers.
Bibliography
Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989). Federal appellate decision recognizing the Section 4(a)(1 and one half) doctrine for resales of restricted securities to sophisticated investors.
FinCEN. Anti-Money Laundering Program and Suspicious Activity Report Filing Requirements for Registered Investment Advisers and Exempt Reporting Advisers. Final Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 72000 (Aug. 28, 2024).
National Association of Private Fund Managers v. SEC, No. 23-60471 (5th Cir. June 5, 2024). Controlling Fifth Circuit authority vacating the SEC Private Fund Adviser Rules.
NVCA. Model Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement. 2019. Industry standard form governing contractual transfer restrictions in VC-backed companies. Available at: https://nvca.org
SEC. Private Secondary Markets. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/resources-small-businesses/capital-raising-building-blocks/private-secondary-markets
SEC. Release IA-6383. Private Fund Advisers; Documentation of Registered Investment Adviser Compliance Reviews. 88 Fed. Reg. 63206 (Aug. 23, 2023).
U.S. Congress. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). Pub. L. No. 114-94 (Dec. 4, 2015). Enacted Section 4(a)(7) of the Securities Act of 1933.
U.S. Congress. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). Pub. L. No. 112-106 (Apr. 5, 2012). Raised Section 12(g) holder-of-record threshold from 500 to 2,000.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982). Established multi-factor test for determining whether a transaction constitutes a tender offer.

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