Restarting the Nuclear Cycle

The Five State Nuclear Waste Storage Plan of 2026

Executive Summary

The Department of Energy’s 2026 plan to site Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses across five states offers the first realistic path beyond the stalled Yucca Mountain repository since 1982. Tennessee, Utah, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Idaho have each entered non binding agreements with the Department to host a campus combining uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, spent fuel reprocessing research, and consolidated waste storage on one site. In exchange, the states anticipate new reactor construction, data center development, and manufacturing investment tied to the domestic nuclear fuel supply chain. The Department intends to narrow the field to three finalists by the end of 2026.

The proposal arrives after two federally licensed interim storage projects, one in Texas and one in New Mexico, collapsed following a 2024 ruling from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lacked statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to license privately owned storage sites located away from operating reactors. Roughly one hundred thousand metric tons of spent commercial fuel currently sit in pools and dry casks at more than seventy reactor sites nationwide, a volume that grows by approximately two thousand metric tons each year. The five state plan asks Congress to authorize what the courts have twice refused to let agencies grant on their own: a legal pathway for the federal government to store spent fuel away from the reactors that produced it. Whether that authorization arrives, and on what statutory terms, will determine if this plan succeeds where four decades of Yucca Mountain litigation did not.

Detailed Findings

Is the five state nuclear waste plan a reasonable solution?

The five state plan is a reasonable attempt at a problem the federal government has failed to solve for over four decades, though its success depends entirely on a change in federal law that has not yet passed. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, amended in 1987 by Public Law 100-203, directed the Department of Energy to build a single permanent repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and to begin accepting utility spent fuel by January 31, 1998. The Department never met that deadline. Federal courts subsequently found the government in breach of its contracts with nuclear utilities, and the Judgment Fund of the United States Treasury has paid out more than thirty four billion dollars in damages to utility companies covering the cost of on site storage the government was supposed to provide. The Department’s own estimate of total future liability under those contracts runs as high as forty four billion dollars.

Nevada opposed Yucca Mountain for decades, and the site also carries real geologic problems. Seismic fault lines run through the mountain, and evidence of past volcanic activity nearby raised doubts about the long term isolation of the repository from groundwater. The five state approach avoids relitigating a single contested site by distributing the function across willing hosts, each offering land, an existing nuclear workforce, and, in Oak Ridge and at Idaho National Laboratory, decades of federal nuclear infrastructure already in place. Idaho National Laboratory’s new Center for Spent Fuel Research, announced by the Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy in January 2026, exemplifies the kind of existing federal nuclear infrastructure the plan intends to build on rather than create new.

The trade the states are offered, waste storage in return for reactor construction and data center investment, resembles the bargain New Mexico’s Eddy and Lea Counties made when they invited the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and, later, the Holtec and Interim Storage Partners projects. That history shows the bargain can work locally even when it fails nationally. The remaining obstacle is legal authority. The Fifth Circuit’s 2024 rulings in the Texas and New Mexico cases held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission cannot license this kind of storage without new statutory language from Congress, and the current plan is, at its core, a request that Congress supply that language. Until it does, every non binding agreement signed with a state remains exactly that: non binding.

What environmental risks come with consolidated nuclear waste storage, and what safeguards can reduce them?

Consolidated storage carries three specific environmental risks: transportation accidents, cask or container failure, and contamination from improper handling once waste arrives on site, and each has a demonstrated safeguard already in use somewhere in the federal system. Transportation is the risk most visible to the public, since spent fuel now stored at reactor sites in states such as New York, Illinois, and California would need to travel by rail or truck to whichever states host the new campuses. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires transport casks to survive a thirty foot drop onto an unyielding surface, a thirty minute fire at fourteen hundred degrees Fahrenheit, and submersion, tests set out in 10 CFR Part 71, and the agency’s own probabilistic risk studies, including NUREG 1864, found the probability of a radiological release during transport to be very low even accounting for collisions, punctures, and derailments.

Storage itself has one clear cautionary example. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico, the nation’s only operating deep geologic repository, suffered a radiological release on February 14, 2014, when a drum of transuranic waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory ruptured underground. Technicians had packed the drum with an organic absorbent instead of the mineral based material its chemical profile required, and the organic material reacted with nitrate salts in the drum to produce heat and pressure that blew off the lid. The accident contaminated roughly thirty five percent of the underground disposal area, closed the facility for nearly three years, and produced direct cleanup costs of approximately five hundred million dollars, with some longer range estimates of total cost approaching two billion dollars. Investigators attributed the rupture to a packaging procedure rather than to any flaw in the salt formation itself, which performed as designed, and the Environmental Protection Agency and the New Mexico Environment Department, which jointly regulate the facility under a hazardous waste permit and a recertification process under 40 CFR Part 191, required the Department of Energy to overhaul waste characterization procedures across every generator site before shipments resumed in January 2017.

The specific safeguards available to any new campus are known quantities rather than untested proposals: NRC dry cask licensing and inspection under 10 CFR Part 72, independent chemical characterization of waste before it ever leaves a reactor site, EPA and state environmental permitting modeled on the WIPP precedent, and a consent based siting process, first attempted by the Department between 2015 and 2021, that ties any host community’s participation to enforceable community benefit agreements rather than a unilateral federal designation. Dry cask systems in use today are rated for seismic events, floods, tornadoes, and aircraft impact, and degradation studies commissioned by the NRC project a service life beyond one hundred years for current cask designs. None of this eliminates risk. It does mean that the specific failure modes this plan will face, packaging error, transport accident, and long term cask integrity, are the same failure modes the federal system has already encountered and, in the case of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, already corrected.

Why doesn’t the United States reprocess spent nuclear fuel the way France does, and what are the alternatives?

The United States does not reprocess commercial spent fuel because of a proliferation policy decision made in 1977 that economics have reinforced ever since. In October 1976, the administration in office at the time paused federal support for commercial reprocessing pending a nonproliferation review, following release of a Ford Foundation funded study, the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group’s Nuclear Power Issues and Choices. On April 7, 1977, the incoming administration made that pause indefinite: it deferred commercial reprocessing on the ground that separating plutonium from spent fuel, the same plutonium usable in a nuclear weapon, would make it easier for other countries to justify doing the same. The decision also ended funding for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor program, which had been designed around a closed fuel cycle. A later administration lifted the formal ban in 1981, yet no commercial reprocessing plant was ever built in the United States, because by then the economics no longer supported one.

France made a different choice and has recycled spent fuel since 1966 at La Hague in Normandy, operated today by Orano. The plant processes more than one thousand metric tons of used fuel annually, recovering uranium and plutonium that Orano’s Melox plant fabricates into mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel. MOX now supplies about ten percent of France’s nuclear generated electricity, and the French government has committed to continuing the recycling program past 2040. Reprocessing still produces high level vitrified waste that requires its own permanent repository, a facility called Cigeo, planned at Bure, so the French approach reduces the volume of spent fuel awaiting final disposal without eliminating the need for one.

The economics explain why the United States did not follow France’s path even after the 1981 policy reversal. A 2003 economic analysis from Harvard’s Belfer Center, comparing the full cost of reprocessing and MOX fabrication against direct disposal, found that reprocessing only becomes cost competitive with a once through fuel cycle once uranium prices exceed roughly three hundred sixty dollars per kilogram, a threshold uranium markets have rarely approached. Separated plutonium streams from conventional PUREX reprocessing also concentrate proliferation risk in a way direct disposal does not, which is why current federal research favors pyroprocessing and electrorefining, techniques that keep plutonium mixed with other actinides rather than isolating it in pure form.

Reprocessing is one alternative to indefinite storage, but not the only one under active federal study. Deep borehole disposal, which places waste as far as five kilometers underground rather than in a mined repository like Yucca Mountain or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, received new technical validation in 2026 from a joint Oklo, Argonne National Laboratory, and Idaho National Laboratory project confirming that waste streams from an electrorefining process are compatible with borehole placement. Continued and expanded dry cask storage at or near existing reactor sites remains the option already in use nationwide and, per NRC risk studies, the one with the longest independently verified safety record. Each option, reprocessing, boreholes, or expanded cask storage, still requires the political and legal decision this five state plan is trying to make: which communities will host the waste, and on what terms.

What historical precedents and policy decisions shape the current plan?

Three prior policy decisions define the legal room the five state plan has to operate in: the Nuclear Waste Policy Act’s original design calling for two repositories, the 2002 congressional override that made Yucca Mountain the law’s sole designated site, and the 2024 Fifth Circuit rulings that closed the private licensing route agencies had been using instead. Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 to require the Department of Energy to select two permanent repositories, one east of the Mississippi and one west, funded by a fee of one mill per kilowatt hour collected from every utility generating nuclear electricity. The eastern site search collapsed under state opposition well before a location was chosen. In 1987, Congress amended the Act to name Yucca Mountain the nation’s only candidate site, and in 2002, over Nevada’s formal objection, Congress and the President completed the designation under Public Law 107-200. Federal funding for licensing Yucca Mountain ended in 2011 after a change in the Department’s litigation posture, and the site has not moved since.

With Yucca Mountain stalled, private developers and willing local governments in Texas and New Mexico pursued a different route starting in the 2010s: consolidated interim storage licensed directly by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at sites away from any reactor. The Commission granted Interim Storage Partners a license for a Texas facility and Holtec International a license for the HI STORE facility in Lea County, New Mexico, in 2023. Both licenses drew legal challenges from the state of Texas and affected landowners, and in 2024 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated both, holding that neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Nuclear Waste Policy Act gives the Commission authority to license privately owned storage facilities that are not tied to a reactor or to a federal repository. Holtec petitioned the Supreme Court, which resolved a related case on procedural standing grounds in 2025 without reaching the underlying statutory question, and Holtec withdrew its New Mexico project shortly after.

That sequence, two agency licenses granted and both vacated by an appellate court for lack of statutory authority, is the direct reason the current plan asks Congress to change the underlying law rather than asking the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to try licensing a third private site under the same disputed authority. The Department’s parallel Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campus initiative, which produced the five state agreements, began with a request for information issued in January 2026 that drew responses from roughly half of the states in the country before narrowing to the five current finalists. Every element of the current plan, the site selection method, the state by state incentive structure, and the request for new legislative authority, responds directly to a specific failure in the sequence that came before it.

Legal and Regulatory Implications

The central legal obstacle facing the five state plan is the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lacks statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to license privately owned spent fuel storage away from a reactor site or a designated federal repository. Congress would need to amend one or both statutes to grant that authority explicitly, or to authorize the Department of Energy itself, rather than a private licensee, to take title to and store the fuel under a different statutory basis. Proposed legislation along these lines, including versions of a Nuclear Waste Administration Act introduced in recent Congresses, would replace the Department’s single site, single agency model with a new federal entity that has authority to negotiate directly with host states and to enter binding, rather than non binding, agreements.

Every host state and every campus site will also need its own set of federal environmental and safety approvals independent of whatever Congress does about interim storage authority. The National Environmental Policy Act requires an environmental impact statement before any campus can begin construction, a process that took Yucca Mountain more than two decades to complete and that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s regulators, the EPA and the New Mexico Environment Department, continue to apply through recurring recertification and permit renewal. NRC licensing under 10 CFR Parts 72 and 71 will govern storage and transport regardless of which entity holds title to the waste. Utilities that have been paying into the Nuclear Waste Fund since 1983 and separately collecting Judgment Fund damages since the government’s 1998 breach will be watching closely whether a functioning storage site finally stops the damages clock, since the Department’s own estimate of total contract liability already exceeds forty billion dollars. Price-Anderson Act indemnification, which caps and pools liability for reactor accidents, does not by its terms extend to a standalone storage or reprocessing campus, so any campus that combines fuel fabrication or reprocessing with reactor operation will need Congress or the NRC to clarify how that liability structure applies to a facility with a mixed fuel cycle mission.

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Open Questions

Will Congress pass legislation granting the Department of Energy or a new federal entity clear authority to store spent fuel at the five campus sites, and on what timeline. Every agreement signed with Tennessee, Utah, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Idaho is non binding until that authority exists, and utilities currently collecting Judgment Fund damages have every incentive to press Congress for a resolution rather than another decade of litigation.

Which three of the five current finalists will the Department select by the end of 2026, and will the losing two states retain any of the promised reactor and manufacturing investment. Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Idaho National Laboratory both bring decades of existing federal nuclear infrastructure that the other finalists do not, a factor the Department has not yet said how it will weigh against community benefit agreements or environmental review timelines.

Will any campus combine reprocessing with fuel fabrication in a way that revives the plutonium separation concern that ended commercial reprocessing in 1977, or will the campuses rely on pyroprocessing and electrorefining methods that keep plutonium mixed with other actinides. The answer determines whether International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty apply differently to campus output than they would to a conventional PUREX plant.

How will Price-Anderson Act liability apply to a facility that fabricates fuel, reprocesses used fuel, and stores waste on one site rather than to a single reactor, and will Congress or the NRC need to write new indemnification rules before any campus can begin construction.

Will deep borehole disposal, still in the technical validation stage as of the Oklo, Argonne, and Idaho National Laboratory study earlier in 2026, mature quickly enough to serve as a permanent disposal method for waste generated at the new campuses, or will campus waste sit in dry casks indefinitely while borehole technology and any eventual successor to Yucca Mountain proceed on separate, slower tracks.

What community benefit terms, financial, infrastructure, or otherwise, will the Department ultimately offer each host state, and will those terms survive a change in federal administration the way the underlying statutory authority, once granted by Congress, would.

Source List

Bloomberg. “Nuclear Waste Could be Headed to Five States in New US Plan.” July 28, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-28/five-states-offer-to-host-us-nuclear-waste-under-trumps-plan. Reports the five state agreements and the spent fuel volume figures cited throughout this report.

E&E News by POLITICO. “Leaked Document Reveals White House Nuclear Waste Plan.” 2026. https://www.eenews.net/articles/leaked-document-reveals-white-house-nuclear-waste-plan/. Details the legislative request underlying the campus proposal.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses Contenders Announced.” Energy.gov, 2026. https://www.energy.gov/articles/nuclear-lifecycle-innovation-campuses-contenders-announced. Primary agency source naming the five finalist states and campus scope.

Wikipedia contributors. “Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository.” Accessed July 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yucca_Mountain_nuclear_waste_repository. Background on the Nuclear Waste Policy Act site designation history and litigation.

Hogan Lovells. “Fifth Circuit Rules against NRC, Vacating Consolidated Interim Storage Facility License in Texas.” Client alert, 2024. https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/fifth-circuit-rules-against-nrc-vacating-consolidated-interim-storage-facility-license-in-texas. Legal analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s licensing authority holding.

World Nuclear News. “Holtec Cancels Plans for New Mexico Interim Storage Facility.” 2025. https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/holtec-cancels-plans-for-new-mexico-interim-storage-facility. Confirms the project’s cancellation following the Fifth Circuit ruling.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. “The Economics of Reprocessing versus Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” 2003. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/economics-reprocessing-vs-direct-disposal-spent-nuclear-fuel. Economic analysis of the reprocessing versus disposal cost threshold.

World Nuclear Association. “Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Waste.” Reviewed 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/storage-and-disposal-of-radioactive-waste. Industry technical reference on La Hague reprocessing volumes and MOX fuel share.

American Nuclear Society, Nuclear Newswire. “Deep Isolation Validates Borehole Disposal for Recycled SNF Waste.” March 26, 2026. https://www.ans.org/news/2026-03-26/article-7882/deep-isolation-validates-borehole-disposal-for-recycled-snf-waste/. Reports the Oklo, Argonne, and Idaho National Laboratory borehole validation study.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Backgrounder on Dry Cask Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” nrc.gov. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dry-cask-storage. Primary agency source on dry cask design standards and risk assessment.

Santa Fe New Mexican. “Cost of Reviving WIPP after Leak Could Top $500 Million.” https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/cost-of-reviving-wipp-after-leak-could-top-million/article_1402a1fd-9e58-52c6-97df-0241375e839d.html. Local reporting on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant accident cleanup costs.

Congressional Research Service. “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development.” EveryCRSReport.com. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22542.html. Congressional research on the 1976 and 1977 reprocessing policy decisions.

Bibliography

American Nuclear Society. “Deep Isolation Validates Borehole Disposal for Recycled SNF Waste.” Nuclear Newswire, March 26, 2026. https://www.ans.org/news/2026-03-26/article-7882/deep-isolation-validates-borehole-disposal-for-recycled-snf-waste/.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. “The Economics of Reprocessing versus Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” 2003. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/economics-reprocessing-vs-direct-disposal-spent-nuclear-fuel.

Bloomberg. “Nuclear Waste Could be Headed to Five States in New US Plan.” July 28, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-28/five-states-offer-to-host-us-nuclear-waste-under-trumps-plan.

Congressional Research Service. “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: U.S. Policy Development.” EveryCRSReport.com. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22542.html.

E&E News by POLITICO. “Leaked Document Reveals White House Nuclear Waste Plan.” 2026. https://www.eenews.net/articles/leaked-document-reveals-white-house-nuclear-waste-plan/.

Hogan Lovells. “Fifth Circuit Rules against NRC, Vacating Consolidated Interim Storage Facility License in Texas.” Client alert, 2024. https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/fifth-circuit-rules-against-nrc-vacating-consolidated-interim-storage-facility-license-in-texas.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “Backgrounder on Dry Cask Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” nrc.gov. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dry-cask-storage.

Santa Fe New Mexican. “Cost of Reviving WIPP after Leak Could Top $500 Million.” https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/cost-of-reviving-wipp-after-leak-could-top-million/article_1402a1fd-9e58-52c6-97df-0241375e839d.html.

U.S. Department of Energy. “Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campuses Contenders Announced.” Energy.gov, 2026. https://www.energy.gov/articles/nuclear-lifecycle-innovation-campuses-contenders-announced.

Wikipedia contributors. “Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository.” Accessed July 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yucca_Mountain_nuclear_waste_repository.

World Nuclear Association. “Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Waste.” Reviewed 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/storage-and-disposal-of-radioactive-waste.

World Nuclear News. “Holtec Cancels Plans for New Mexico Interim Storage Facility.” 2025. https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/holtec-cancels-plans-for-new-mexico-interim-storage-facility.

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