Dual Class Share Structures: A Venture Capital Research Report
Dual class share structures, in which a company issues two or more classes of common stock carrying different voting rights per share, have become one of the most consequential and contested features of the modern venture capital ecosystem. Under the typical arrangement, founders retain Class B shares carrying ten votes per share while public or outside investors receive Class A shares carrying one vote per share. This architecture allows a founder to sell substantial equity at an initial public offering while retaining effective control of the enterprise for years or decades after the liquidity event.
The prevalence of dual class structures at IPO has risen sharply over the past decade. Among technology IPOs in the United States, the share with multi-class structures reached 46 percent in 2021 and remained at 44 percent in 2023, compared to a fraction of that figure in the early 2000s. In the first half of 2024 alone, companies including Reddit, Rubrik, Ibotta, Tempus AI, Onestream, and ServiceTitan all debuted with multi-class capital structures. The rise correlates directly with the surge in private capital availability: as founders gained access to larger pools of venture funding and remained private longer, their bargaining power at IPO expanded, and the demand for governance control rights correspondingly increased.
For venture capital investors, dual class structures present a layered strategic question. On one hand, accommodating founder control preserves access to category-defining deals in competitive financing markets. On the other hand, surrendering governance leverage at the pre-IPO stage means that institutional investors who ultimately hold the public shares bear economic risk without commensurate voting power. Academic research finds that dual class firms trade at a premium in the years immediately following IPO, but that premium erodes to a discount after approximately seven years, particularly when the founding generation is no longer operationally engaged. This report examines the mechanics, market dynamics, regulatory landscape, governance debate, and strategic implications of dual class share structures from a sophisticated venture capital perspective.
Market Landscape and Prevalence
The adoption of dual class structures at the IPO stage has accelerated markedly since 2014. According to data maintained by Jay Ritter at the University of Florida, approximately 30 percent of all U.S. IPOs between 2017 and 2019 carried a multi-class share structure. By 2021, that figure reached 32 percent across all IPO categories and 46 percent within the technology sector specifically. The trend has been sustained through subsequent market cycles: in 2023, 26 percent of all IPOs and 44 percent of technology IPOs carried a multi-class structure, and the first half of 2024 saw a nearly continuous stream of high-profile technology companies adopting the architecture.
The international dimension is equally significant. Both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Singapore Exchange revised their listing rules in 2018 to permit dual class listings, motivated in part by competition with U.S. exchanges for high-growth Asian technology issuers. China authorized the structure in 2019, and the United Kingdom reformed its listing rules in 2021 to accommodate weighted voting rights. This global convergence suggests that exchange competition for technology company listings has exerted a structural pressure toward accommodation of founder control mechanisms, regardless of the governance concerns raised by institutional investors.
Deal Structure and Mechanics
The most common implementation pairs Class A shares carrying one vote per share with Class B shares carrying ten votes per share, with Class B concentrated in the hands of founders and, in some cases, early insiders. Under this 10:1 ratio, a founder retaining just 9.1 percent of the total outstanding equity controls 50 percent of the vote. The practical effect is that founders can raise multiple rounds of dilutive capital, execute a public offering, and still repel hostile takeovers, proxy contests, and shareholder resolutions that conflict with their operational vision.
Sunset provisions define the temporal boundary of this control arrangement. A time-based sunset automatically converts high-vote shares to single-vote shares after a defined period, typically measured from the IPO date. An event-based sunset triggers conversion upon the death or departure of the named founder, transfer of high-vote shares to a non-founder party, or reduction of the founder’s economic stake below a specified threshold. The class of 2023 and 2024 technology IPOs illustrated the range of prevailing practice: Tempus AI adopted a 20-year time-based sunset, ServiceTitan adopted 15 years, Rubrik adopted 10 years, and Ibotta, Oddity, and Klaviyo each adopted 7-year sunsets, with Klaviyo pairing this with an ownership-based trigger that activates if the founder’s economic stake falls below a defined floor. Reddit adopted no time-based sunset at all, relying solely on an ownership-based trigger set at 8 percent of outstanding shares.
The NVCA Model Legal Documents, which govern the majority of U.S. venture capital preferred stock financings, do not themselves mandate a dual class structure. The standard NVCA charter contemplates a single class of common stock into which all preferred shares convert upon a qualified IPO. The dual class architecture is instead adopted as a board and stockholder decision at the pre-IPO recapitalization stage, typically in the six to eighteen months preceding a public offering. This timing means that the structure is negotiated between the founder, the VC-dominated board, and underwriters. Updated NVCA model documents issued in 2024 addressed board composition rights following share assignments but did not alter the fundamental treatment of voting class design at IPO.
Investment Thesis and Venture Capital Dynamics
The introduction of cloud computing beginning approximately in 2006 reduced the capital intensity of software-based startups, increasing founders’ relative bargaining power by reducing their dependence on venture financing for basic infrastructure. The combination of lower capital requirements and abundant dry powder created a structural shift in founder-VC bargaining dynamics that persists into the current market.
The VC investor’s calculus when confronting a founder’s demand for a dual class structure involves several competing considerations. Refusing a founder’s request risks losing the deal to a competing fund in a competitive market. Accepting the structure preserves economic upside but reduces post-IPO governance leverage. Academic research suggests that VC-backed firms are now just as likely to go public with a dual class structure as non-VC-backed firms, representing a reversal from historical patterns in which founder-led dual class IPOs were predominantly non-VC-backed. This shift signals that venture capital investors have broadly accommodated the governance concession as a condition of access to the highest-quality deal flow.
The performance data on dual class firms suggests that this accommodation carries real long-term costs. Empirical studies find that dual class firms tend to trade at a valuation premium relative to comparable single-class firms in the first several years following IPO, as markets price in the value of insulated founder-led execution. However, that premium erodes to a discount approximately seven years post-IPO. Research published in the Journal of Financial Research finds that the positive association between disproportionate insider control and corporate innovation is limited to roughly ten years post-IPO, with negligible benefits thereafter. The practical implication is that the optimal sunset for a dual class structure, from both a governance and a return optimization standpoint, aligns closely with the seven to ten year range that institutional investors and proxy advisory firms have advocated.
Governance Debate and Institutional Opposition
The Council of Institutional Investors, which represents pension funds, endowments, and foundations managing trillions in assets, has maintained a formal policy position opposing dual class structures without time-based sunset provisions. The organization has urged the SEC to work with stock exchanges to bar new issuances of no-vote share classes and require that any differential voting structure include a sunset of no more than seven years. CalPERS, one of the largest public pension funds in the United States, has committed to vote against directors at companies with perpetual dual class structures and has described the architecture as fundamentally incompatible with fiduciary-grade governance standards.
Proxy advisory firms have operationalized these governance concerns through voting recommendations that penalize boards at dual class companies. Both ISS and Glass Lewis issue policies recommending votes against directors at companies with multi-class structures that lack a sunset provision of seven years or fewer. In the 2024 proxy season, analysis of proxy voting outcomes found that insiders at dual class companies skewed vote outcomes by an estimated 19 percentage points across 47 shareholder proposals. Companies with super-voting share classes reported an average of 92.9 percent approval for executive pay packages, but adjusting for insider bloc voting, minority shareholder support fell to 85.6 percent, compared to 89.3 percent at single-class companies. The gap illustrates the practical disenfranchisement of institutional shareholders at dual class companies.
Index inclusion decisions have added a material financial dimension to the governance debate. Following the Snap IPO in 2017, which offered shares with no voting rights whatsoever, S and P Dow Jones Indices announced a prohibition on dual class companies entering the S and P Composite 1500 and its component indices effective August 2017. Existing constituents were grandfathered. However, in 2023 the S and P reversed its position and resumed traditional accommodation for multi-class governance structures without a sunset requirement, a reversal that critics characterized as capitulation to market competition pressures. MSCI chose a different approach: it weights index inclusion by actual voting power rather than by economic ownership, which structurally reduces the index weight of companies with super-voting founder shares.
Regulatory Environment
The primary regulatory framework governing dual class structures in the United States is Delaware corporate law, which under Title 8 of the Delaware Code authorizes companies to issue multiple classes of stock with distinct voting rights, subject to disclosure requirements and the mechanics of class votes on charter amendments. Delaware law generally requires that each class of stock vote separately to approve amendments to a corporation’s certificate of incorporation that disproportionately affect that class, but the NVCA model documents and standard VC-backed charters typically override this default by providing that all shares vote together on an as-converted basis. A Delaware Supreme Court ruling in early 2024 clarified that corporations with multi-class capital structures are not required to hold a separate class vote where they adopt exculpatory charter provisions, narrowing the protective scope of class-specific voting rights.
At the federal level, the SEC requires disclosure of voting structures under Regulation S-K in registration statements and annual reports but has not promulgated rules mandating sunset provisions or limiting the differential between voting classes. Companies with super-voting share classes are not required to disaggregate vote outcomes by share class in their proxy filings, a gap that the Council of Institutional Investors has specifically identified as a deficiency in investor protection. In January 2026, SEC Chairman Paul Atkins issued a statement directing the Division of Corporation Finance to review and reform Regulation S-K disclosures to focus on information that a reasonable investor would consider material to investment and voting decisions, a review that could encompass voting structure disclosure practices.
Congressional attention to dual class structures has been largely reactive and has not produced legislation. The Congressional Research Service has documented the policy debate in an issue brief noting the tension between founder-driven efficiency arguments and institutional investor governance arguments. Legislative proposals to mandate sunset provisions or restrict exchange listings of no-vote share classes have been introduced but not enacted, in part because of the competitive concern that restricting dual class structures at U.S. exchanges would redirect technology IPOs to London, Hong Kong, or other jurisdictions that have embraced the architecture.
Risk Factors
For venture capital investors, the risks of dual class structures cluster around three distinct phases of the investment lifecycle. During the private financing phase, the risk is that founders negotiate aggressively for governance terms that VC investors accept to win allocation, setting precedents that may constrain exit flexibility and post-IPO governance influence. At the IPO phase, the risk is that public market investors discount the offering price to reflect the governance premium demanded by rational buyers of economically exposed but governance-neutered shares, which can compress the exit multiple available to VC holders. In the post-IPO phase, the risk is that a founder’s long-term control insulates underperformance from correction, destroying value for all shareholders including pre-IPO holders who retained equity in the public company.
The Facebook data privacy controversy illustrates the governance failure risk in concrete terms. Institutional critics pointed to the dual class structure as the mechanism that prevented shareholders from responding to governance failures when the controlling founder held approximately one percent of economic equity but more than 60 percent of voting power. The structural inability of institutional shareholders to influence board composition or force operational changes is not simply an abstract governance concern: it represents a systematic transfer of decision-making authority to a single individual whose economic incentives diverge from those of minority shareholders as their ownership stake shrinks.
Open Questions
1. Will the SEC reform of Regulation S-K require disaggregated voting disclosure at dual class companies?
The January 2026 Regulation S-K reform initiative directed by SEC Chairman Paul Atkins could require companies to disclose proxy vote outcomes on a per-class basis. If adopted, this would make visible the gap between stated approval rates and actual minority shareholder sentiment at dual class companies, altering the public perception of governance quality and potentially affecting trading liquidity and institutional ownership levels.
2. Does the S and P reversal on dual class exclusion represent a durable shift or a temporary accommodation?
The 2023 decision by S and P Dow Jones Indices to resume admitting dual class companies into major indices reversed a six-year exclusion policy and removed a significant market-access penalty for companies adopting the structure. Whether index providers will maintain this posture through market cycles or reimpose restrictions in response to governance failures at specific dual class constituents is an open and materially significant question for founders evaluating IPO capital structure decisions.
3. What is the optimal sunset period for dual class structures from a value maximization standpoint?
Academic research suggests the seven to ten year range captures most of the innovation and execution benefits of founder control while avoiding the value discount that emerges in the second decade post-IPO. However, market practice varies significantly, and some recent IPOs have adopted sunsets of fifteen or twenty years. The empirical literature does not yet have sufficient post-sunset data from the current wave of dual class IPOs to definitively establish the optimal term length.
4. How will artificial intelligence and other capital-light technology cycles affect founder bargaining power?
The NBER research on dual class structures identifies reduced capital intensity as a key driver of founder control demands. The current generation of AI-native software companies requires substantially less capital for product development than prior technology cycles, which may further increase founder leverage in VC negotiations and accelerate the prevalence of dual class structures in the next wave of technology IPOs.
5. Will Hong Kong or other international exchanges capture technology IPOs deterred by U.S. governance norms?
Hong Kong proposed in early 2026 to lower the market capitalization threshold for dual class listings in an explicit effort to attract high-growth technology issuers. If U.S. institutional pressure results in stricter sunset requirements or index exclusions, the competitive calculus for technology companies evaluating listing venues may shift meaningfully, with consequences for the depth and liquidity of the U.S. public equity market.
6. Does the current enforcement posture of the SEC under Chairman Atkins signal reduced scrutiny of dual class governance?
The deregulatory orientation of the current SEC leadership, reflected in the Regulation S-K reform initiative and broader rollbacks of ESG-related disclosure requirements, may reduce the probability of new federal constraints on dual class structures. For founders and VC investors evaluating capital structure choices, the regulatory risk of adopting long-duration or perpetual dual class architectures may be lower in the current environment than at any point in the past decade.
Source List
Primary Legal and Regulatory Sources
• Delaware General Corporation Law, Title 8, Chapter 1, Subchapter IV (del.code.delaware.gov): Statutory authority for multi-class capital structures in the dominant U.S. incorporation jurisdiction.
• SEC, Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. Part 229): Federal disclosure requirements governing voting structure disclosures in registration statements and periodic reports.
• Delaware Supreme Court, 2024 ruling on class vote requirements for exculpatory charter provisions (Ballard Spahr summary, January 2024): Clarified the scope of class-specific voting protections for multi-class companies.
• SEC Chairman Paul Atkins, Statement on Reforming Regulation S-K (January 2026, sec.gov): Launched a formal review of disclosure requirements with potential implications for voting structure reporting.
Industry Benchmarks and Data
• Jay Ritter, University of Florida, Initial Public Offerings: Dual Class Structure of IPOs Through 2025 (site.warrington.ufl.edu): Authoritative longitudinal dataset on dual class IPO frequency and structure.
• NVCA Model Legal Documents, including Voting Agreement and updated forms (2023 and 2024) (nvca.org): Industry standard governing the mechanics of VC-backed company governance.
• Council of Institutional Investors, Dual-Class Stock policy position and resource center (cii.org): Principal institutional advocacy position and data compilation on dual class governance concerns.
• Sustainalytics, How Unequal Shareholder Rights Influence Proxy Voting Outcomes and Corporate Governance (2024): Quantified analysis of insider voting impact in the 2024 proxy season.
Academic Research
• Dhruv Aggarwal, Ofer Eldar, Yael Hochberg, Lubomir Litov, The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs, NBER Working Paper No. 28609 (2021, updated): Causal analysis of the relationship between private capital availability and founder control at IPO.
• Baran et al., Dual-Class Share Structure and Innovation, Journal of Financial Research (2023): Empirical finding that innovation benefits of dual class structures are limited to approximately ten years post-IPO.
• Gregory Shill, The Social Costs and Benefits of Dual-Class Stock, Alabama Law Review (2023): Balanced academic treatment of governance costs and founder-protection benefits.
• Vincent Deluard, A Costly Mistake for Investors, U.S. Capital Markets, and Growth: Evidence from the Exclusion of Dual-Class Stocks from Popular Indices, SSRN Working Paper No. 4060296: Empirical analysis of the performance cost of index exclusion for dual class companies.
News and Trade Publications
• Meritech Capital, Klaviyo IPO S-1 Breakdown (meritechcapital.com, 2023): Detailed structural analysis of a leading 2023 dual class technology IPO.
• CNBC, The IPO Reopening Is Real: Take Rubrik, the First Unicorn to Go Public in Months (April 2024): Coverage of the Rubrik dual class IPO and the 2024 IPO market reopening.
• Morgan Lewis, What is New in the NVCA Model Legal Documents and What is Next (September 2024): Legal analysis of 2024 NVCA document updates and their implications for VC deal terms.
• Cooley CapX, Considerations for Implementing a Multi-Class Share Structure (February 2025): Practitioner guidance on structural and timing considerations for dual class adoption.
General Web and Investor Commentary
• Gibson Dunn, Debating the Pros and Cons of Dual Class Capital Structures: Practitioner overview of the governance debate.
• Yale Insights, In Defense of Dual-Class Shares: Academic defense of founder control mechanisms.
• Global Compliance News, China, Hong Kong and Singapore: The Revival of Dual Class Shares (2020): International comparative context for exchange-level policy evolution.
• Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Glass Lewis and ISS Publish 2025 Updates (February 2025): Summary of proxy advisory policy changes effective for the 2025 proxy season.
Bibliography
• Aggarwal, Dhruv, Ofer Eldar, Yael V. Hochberg, and Lubomir P. Litov. “The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs.” NBER Working Paper No. 28609. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021. https://www.nber.org/papers/w28609.
• Atkins, Paul S. Statement on Reforming Regulation S-K. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, January 13, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/atkins-statement-reforming-regulation-s-k-011326.
• Ballard Spahr LLP. “Delaware Supreme Court: No Class Vote Required Where Corporations With Multi-Class Capital Structure Adopted Exculpatory Charter Provision.” January 2024. https://www.ballardspahr.com/insights/alerts-and-articles/2024/01/de-supreme-court-no-class-vote-required-where-corporations-adopted-provision.
• Baran, Loran, et al. “Dual-Class Share Structure and Innovation.” Journal of Financial Research 46, no. 3 (2023). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jfir.12311.
• CNBC. “The IPO Reopening Is Real. Just Look at Rubrik, the First Unicorn to Go Public in Months.” April 25, 2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/04/25/the-ipo-reopening-is-real-take-rubrik-the-first-public-unicorn-since-the-fall.html.
• Cooley LLP CapitalXchange. “Considerations for Implementing a Multi-Class Share Structure.” February 5, 2025. https://capx.cooley.com/2025/02/05/considerations-for-implementing-a-multi-class-share-structure/.
• Council of Institutional Investors. “Dual-Class Stock.” CII Resource Center. https://www.cii.org/dualclass_stock. Accessed March 2026.
• Delaware Code Online. Title 8, Chapter 1. https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04/.
• Deluard, Vincent. “A Costly Mistake for Investors, U.S. Capital Markets, and Growth: Evidence from the Exclusion of Dual-Class Stocks from Popular Indices.” SSRN Working Paper No. 4060296, 2022. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4060296.
• Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP. “Debating the Pros and Cons of Dual Class Capital Structures.” https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/GloverThamodaran-DualClassCapitalStructures.pdf.
• Glass Lewis. 2025 Benchmark Policy Guidelines. November 14, 2024. https://resources.glasslewis.com/hubfs/2025%20Guidelines/2025%20Shareholder%20Proposals%20&%20ESG%20Benchmark%20Policy%20Guidelines.pdf.
• Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. “Shareholder Democracy and the Challenge of Dual Class Share Structures.” February 11, 2025. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/02/11/shareholder-democracy-and-the-challenge-of-dual-class-share-structures/.
• Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. “Glass Lewis and ISS Publish 2025 Updates.” February 11, 2025. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/02/11/glass-lewis-and-iss-publish-2025-updates/.
• Meritech Capital. “Klaviyo IPO S-1 Breakdown.” 2023. https://www.meritechcapital.com/blog/klaviyo-ipo-s-1-breakdown.
• Morgan Lewis. “What is New in the NVCA Model Legal Documents and What is Next.” September 2024. https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2024/09/whats-new-in-the-nvca-model-legal-documents-and-whats-next.
• National Venture Capital Association. Model Legal Documents. https://nvca.org/document-category/model-legal-documents/.
• Ritter, Jay R. “Initial Public Offerings: Dual Class Structure of IPOs Through 2025.” University of Florida. https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs-Dual-Class.pdf.
• Shill, Gregory H. “The Social Costs and Benefits of Dual-Class Stock.” Alabama Law Review 75 (2023): 221-274. https://law.ua.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/5-Shill-221-274.pdf.
• Sustainalytics. “How Unequal Shareholder Rights Influence Proxy Voting Outcomes and Corporate Governance.” 2024. https://www.sustainalytics.com/esg-research/resource/investors-esg-blog/how-unequal-shareholder-rights-influence-proxy-voting-outcomes-and-corporate-governance.
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