Delaware’s SB 21 reforms did not stop the 2026 DExit wave to Nevada and Texas
Executive Summary
Delaware enacted Senate Bill 21 in March 2025 to curb the wave of corporate departures that commentators call DExit, yet Coinbase Global completed its own move to Texas on December 15, 2025 regardless. For a privately held, venture backed startup, the calculus that drove Coinbase, Tesla, and Roblox out of Delaware does not transfer cleanly. Those companies faced controlling stockholder litigation, a contested chief executive compensation package, or an industry alignment with Texas regulators that a seed or Series A company simply does not share. A startup with a small board and a standard preferred stock charter is weighing a narrower question: whether Nevada’s newly broadened liability shield for controlling stockholders under Assembly Bill 239, or Texas’s codified business judgment rule under Senate Bill 29, is worth trading away decades of Delaware Court of Chancery precedent on preferred stock rights, board fiduciary duties, and merger mechanics.
This report traces the sequence that produced the current reincorporation wave: the Court of Chancery’s 2024 rescission of a Tesla compensation package in Tornetta v. Musk, Delaware’s 2025 legislative response, the Delaware Supreme Court’s February 2026 decision upholding that response, and the competing statutory packages Nevada and Texas assembled to attract departing corporations. It quantifies the scale of the movement, distinguishes the litigation risk facing large public companies from the practical concerns facing a private venture backed company, and identifies where the law in Nevada and Texas is still too new to answer the questions a startup’s counsel and investors will actually ask before a financing, an acquisition, or an initial public offering.
Detailed Findings
What Triggered the Wave: Tornetta v. Musk and the Cost of Delaware Litigation
In January 2024, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled in Tornetta v. Musk, 310 A.3d 430 (Del. Ch. 2024), rescinding a compensation package awarded to Tesla’s chief executive on the ground that the package resulted from a process led by a board with close personal and financial ties to that officer. Tesla’s board responded by putting a reincorporation to Texas to a stockholder vote before the end of 2024, using the redomestication mechanics of 8 Del. C. § 266 to move outside Delaware entirely. The company also pursued a second round of stockholder ratification of the same pay package and appealed the rescission. On December 19, 2025, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the rescission remedy in In re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 2025 WL 3689114 (Del. Dec. 19, 2025), holding that rescission was an improper remedy because it would leave the chief executive uncompensated for six years of service, and reducing the plaintiff’s attorney fee award from $345 million to $54.5 million while leaving the underlying finding of a flawed approval process undisturbed. The fee award, even after reduction, told public company boards what a Delaware breach of fiduciary duty finding can cost regardless of the ultimate remedy, and the case became the recruiting example every state courting a Delaware departure now cites.
Delaware’s Countermeasure: Senate Bill 21 and Its Judicial Test
Delaware’s governor signed Senate Bill 21 on March 25, 2025, amending 8 Del. C. §§ 144 and 220. The amendment to Section 144 creates a safe harbor for a transaction involving a controlling stockholder or a conflicted director or officer: approval by an independent committee of at least two disinterested directors, or by a majority of disinterested stockholders, forecloses a damages claim for breach of the duty of care, and a going private transaction now requires both approvals to qualify. The amendment to Section 220 narrows stockholder inspection rights, requiring a demand to state its proper purpose and the records sought with reasonable particularity, and letting the corporation withhold records beyond an enumerated list absent a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of a compelling need. A stockholder challenged the amendments as an unconstitutional retroactive stripping of the Court of Chancery’s equitable jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected that argument on February 27, 2026, in Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, No. 248, 2025 (Del. Feb. 27, 2026), holding that the General Assembly has the same authority to define the scope of a fiduciary duty claim that it already exercised when it authorized exculpation clauses under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), and that a stockholder who must now litigate under the new statutory standard rather than the prior common law rule has lost a favorable procedure, not a remedy. Delaware’s fix is now settled law, but it did not stop the departures already in motion, and it gave both Nevada and Texas a concrete Delaware limitation to define themselves against.
Nevada’s Pitch: Broad Exculpation Under NRS 78.138 and Assembly Bill 239
Nevada has offered corporations broad statutory exculpation since 1987 under NRS § 78.138(7), and Nevada courts have narrowly construed the statute’s exceptions, treating the intentional misconduct exception as met only on particularized facts of wrongful intent, a standard rarely satisfied at the pleading stage. Nevada’s legislature extended that same protection to controlling stockholders in May 2025 through Assembly Bill 239. Under the amended statute, a controlling stockholder owes essentially one obligation: not to pressure a director into a breach that would expose the director to non exculpated liability for self dealing. A controlling stockholder who extracts value from the corporation without committing fraud, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law faces no damages claim, and because Nevada stockholders lack Delaware style inspection rights to board minutes and internal records, they face little practical prospect of pleading the exception even where it might apply. Nevada’s approach removes judicial review of controlling stockholder self dealing more completely than Delaware’s contested Section 144 safe harbor does, at the cost of a shallower body of decided cases construing what a Nevada fiduciary actually owes a minority stockholder in a preferred stock financing, a down round, or a change of control transaction.
Texas’s Pitch: Senate Bill 29, the Business Court, and the Codified Business Judgment Rule
Texas took a different route. Its 2025 Senate Bill 29 amended the Texas Business Organizations Code to codify a business judgment rule at TBOC § 21.419 for public companies and companies that opt in: a director or officer is presumed to have acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the corporation’s interest, and a plaintiff must plead fraud, intentional misconduct, an ultra vires act, or a knowing violation of law to overcome the presumption. TBOC § 21.418(f) extends conflict of interest protection to interested transactions that meet the same standard. TBOC § 7.001, effective September 1, 2025, lets a corporation exculpate officers from money damages to the same extent Delaware and most states already allow for directors, subject to the usual carve outs for disloyalty, intentional misconduct, and improper personal benefit. TBOC § 21.552 lets an opted in public company, or a company with more than 500 stockholders, require a derivative plaintiff to own up to 3 percent of outstanding shares before suing. Texas paired these statutory changes with a specialized Texas Business Court, which convened in September 2024 and completed its first bench trial, a dispute involving Marathon Oil Co., in November 2025. Coinbase Global’s stockholders approved reincorporation to Texas by roughly 78 percent of the vote cast, and the move became effective on December 15, 2025. A pending federal challenge in Texas to the state’s proxy advisory firm disclosure requirements under TBOC Chapter 6A, brought on First Amendment grounds, is the one pending dispute that could complicate Texas’s pitch to public companies that rely on proxy advisory firms during a contested vote. That dispute has no direct bearing on a private startup with no public stockholders to solicit.
The Scale of the 2026 DExit Wave
Between January 2024 and March 2026, corporations proposed approximately 49 reincorporations out of Delaware, with 2025 alone producing 26 proposals, 21 approved by stockholder vote and 7 approved by written consent, the largest single year for such proposals on record. Delaware’s share of United States initial public offerings fell from a range of 80 to 93 percent over the prior decade to 62 percent in 2025, with Nevada capturing 17 percent of new listings and Texas 4 percent. The companies making the move skew toward founder led or founder controlled corporations in the technology, cryptocurrency, and energy sectors, precisely the profile most exposed to the controlling stockholder litigation that Section 144 and Assembly Bill 239 now address from opposite directions. The trend is not automatic: a Nevada reincorporation proposal at Netcapital Inc. failed by nearly one million votes in 2025, evidence that a controlling stockholder’s preference for a looser liability standard is not something minority stockholders reliably share once they are asked to vote on it.
Why a Venture Backed Startup’s Calculus Differs From a Public Company’s
Every figure above describes a public company redomestication executed by stockholder vote or written consent under 8 Del. C. § 266, because a Delaware corporation with public stockholders cannot change its state of incorporation by board resolution alone. A private venture backed startup faces no such vote; its founders and board choose the state of incorporation at formation, and changing it later ordinarily requires only board approval and the consent of a much smaller, contractually aligned capitalization table. The statutory fight over controlling stockholder liability that produced Section 144, Assembly Bill 239, and TBOC § 21.418(f) addresses a problem a seed or Series A company rarely has: a controlling stockholder extracting value from public minority stockholders in a going private or freeze out transaction. A venture backed company’s live legal questions concern how a court will read a preferred stockholder’s protective provisions, liquidation preference, and information rights when a dispute arises, and on that question Delaware’s Court of Chancery carries decades of decided cases construing standard venture financing charter language that Nevada’s courts and the still new Texas Business Court have not yet had occasion to construe.
In thirty years of closing venture financings, this author has yet to see a lead investor’s term sheet name Nevada or Texas as the closing jurisdiction; every term sheet still opens with the assumption that the company is, or will become, a Delaware corporation, because that assumption lets outside counsel on both sides of the table predict how a dispute over a down round or a drag along provision will come out. Delaware’s franchise tax, calculated under the assumed par value method for a company with a large authorized share count, can still run higher for a well financed startup than Nevada’s flat annual list and business license fees, or Texas’s franchise tax, which applies only above a margin threshold of $2.47 million and rarely reaches a pre revenue company at all. That tax gap is measurable but small next to the cost of litigating a preferred stockholder dispute in a court with no developed precedent to guide either side’s expectations.
Want more industry insights? I publish daily analysis on the intersection of deep tech and venture law.
Open Questions
Will Nevada’s Supreme Court’s planned business court panel, expected to begin hearing cases later in 2026, produce a body of precedent construing preferred stock rights and board duties in time to matter to companies now forming, given how much a venture financing negotiation depends on predicting how a court will read a standard clause.
Will the pending federal First Amendment challenge to TBOC Chapter 6A’s proxy advisory firm disclosure requirement succeed, and if it does, will that ruling reach a venture backed company that has no public stockholders to solicit in the first place.
Will the venture financing charter and voting agreement forms that Delaware practice has standardized over three decades be adapted for use under Nevada Chapter 78 and the Texas Business Organizations Code, or will lead investors continue to require Delaware incorporation as a closing condition regardless of what public companies do.
Will an acquirer or an underwriter price a Nevada or Texas incorporated startup differently at the time of a sale or an initial public offering, given that Delaware’s body of merger and appraisal case law remains the reference point most buy side and underwriting counsel were trained on.
Will Delaware respond to a continued decline in its franchise tax revenue and its share of new incorporations with a further legislative accommodation beyond Senate Bill 21, or will the General Assembly treat Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC as having settled the argument.
Will Nevada’s extension of exculpation to controlling stockholders under Assembly Bill 239 survive a constitutional challenge of its own, following the pattern Delaware’s Section 144 amendments already went through.
Interested in analysis about the intersection of tech, policy and the law? Check out my Substack channel. https://theinnovationattorney.substack.com/